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application of the hearsay rule. The mere reading from a medical treatise to a
jury, or the submission of an excerpt from such a treatise to the trial judge, is a
clear case where the rule against the admission of hearsay should operate to
exclude the evidence. Such is the result under the general rule followed by all
states except Alabama.
Where the medical treatise is introduced in a workmen's compensation pro-
ceeding in conjunction with expert opinion evidence, there is little justification
for refusal to permit consideration of the evidence. Certainly under the California
rule and probably under the majority rule (New York's "residuum" rule) a
compensation award can be based upon a treatise corroborated by expert
opinion evidence.
Even in a court trial where expert opinion evidence is presented in conjunc-
tion with the reading of a medical treatise, a strong case can be made for
permitting the reading. This position has been adopted by only a few states,
but it is worthy of much wider recognition. It is questionable whether reading
from medical texts in a workmen's compensation proceeding without an expert
witness available should be permitted, at least where, as under the California
rule, any kind of hearsay evidence may be the sole basis of the award. Under
the residuum rule, corroborating, expert opinion evidence would be unnecessary
only if there were other legal evidence which could provide some support for the
decision. The difference between these two kinds of rules is in the amount of
faith placed in the expertise of the commissioners. Since their expertise does not
make them medical experts, the majority (residuum) rule may be the better
view.
Donald G. Cherry
SOUND MOTION PICTURES AS EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION
IN DRUNKEN DRIVING PROSECUTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Since 1950 the number of Americans killed in motor vehicle accidents has
increased steadily and is now almost 50,000 per year.' While exact statistics are
impossible to obtain, it has been estimated that between one-third and one-half
of the drivers involved in fatal accidents had been drinking.2 In response to this
obvious alcoholic menace many states have instituted "get-tough" law-enforce-
ment techniques. While these programs, and the accompanying publicity, may
have convinced some potentially-dangerous individuals not to drive, they do not
assure that an apprehended driver, if intoxicated, will eventually be convicted.
I Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States
576 (1966).
2 Johnson, "Blood Test Results-Their Admissibility To Show a Decedent's Intoxication"
38 Ind. L.J. 603 n.1 (1963); Kozelka, "Scientific Tests for Alcohol Intoxication," in Institute
on Scientific and Laboratory Methods of Judicial Proof, p. M-1 (Univ. of Wisc. 1951);
Note, 49 Va. L. Rev. 386 n.1 (1963).
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The Problem of Obtaining Convictions Without Chemical Tests
Without chemical evidence of a defendant's state of intoxication, a prosecutor
must rely heavily upon the arresting officer's testimony to obtain a conviction.
The officer will probably describe the physical appearance of the defendant-the
odor of his breath, the condition of his pupils, his ability to speak and walk, and
his general behavior 3 These criteria, however, are quite unreliable. Breath odor4
and other incriminating characteristics may result from causes far removed from
over-indulgence in alcohol. 5 In fact, from the symptoms above a physician, as an
expert witness, could not swear that an individual defendant had consumed any
alcohol at all.6
Faced with the necessity of obtaining convictions if their increased enforce-
ment efforts are to have any deterrent or punitive7 effect, the states have turned
to scientific and pseudo-scientific testing techniques to furnish the needed evi-
dence of intoxication.
The Problems Raised by Chemical Testing
Virtually every state now sanctions the use of chemical tests for the purpose
of establishing a defendant's state of intoxication.8 These statutes and decisions
3 This list contains the usual symptoms of intoxication. Kozelka, supra note 2, at III-1.
See State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 796, 117 S.E.2d 749, 749-50 (1961), where the state's
evidence, consisting solely of the arresting officer's testimony, was as follows:
The officer stopped defendant on account of the manner (described in detail) in which
defendant was operating his car. Defendant, when he walked out in front of the patrol
car, "weaved and wobbled." His speech was "slurred" and the odor of alcohol was upon
his breath. In defendant's car, there was a six-pack carton of Budweiser Beer, contain-
ing four full bottles and one empty bottle, and also a partially filled bottle (containing
thirteen ounces) of vodka.
4 Breath odor is in no way proportional to the amount of alcohol actually consumed,
being principally a function of the flavoring matter of the liquor. Harger, "Some Practical
Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxication," in Institute on Scientific and Laboratory
Methods of Judicial Proof, p. 111-16 (Univ. of Wisc. 1951).
5 Among the other possible causes are epilepsy, concussion, heart attack, diabetes, over-
dose of insulin, and the use of drugs such as barbituates and tranquillizers. Borkenstein &
Smith, "The Breathalyzer and Its Applications," 2 Med. Sci. & Law 13, 21 (1961). To make
the proof of intoxication more difficult, it appears that many defendants are able to find
witnesses, sometimes from the local tavern, to testify that the accused certainly had not
seemed intoxicated to them, although this is not always the best defense. See Erwin, "Defense
of Persons Accused of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol," 11 Prac. Law. 73,
78 (No. 1, 1965).
6 Harger, supra note 4, at 111-16. See Erwin, supra note 5, at 80-83.
7 See id. at 74 where the author states that "a single drunken-driving conviction in the
State of California would cost the convicted person about $1,000 over a three-year period
in additional auto insurance premiums, if he carries ordinary coverage on two automobiles."
Of course this is in addition to the very heavy fine often imposed.
8 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 n.3 (1957); Richardson, "Scientific Evidence
in the Law," 44 Ky. L.J. 277, 280 (1956). There are apparently two theories under which
a state may authorize the use of these tests. The first is the "implied consent" or "right-
privilege" theory. See Comment, 49 Va. L. Rev. 386, 388 (1963) and cases collected therein.
Under this theory the use of the state's highways is viewed as a privilege rather than a right.
Since the state has the power to exclude a motorist from its highways, it also has the power
to extend that privilege to him upon the condition that he "consent" to chemical tests when
required. Under the second theory a state may, through its police power, curtail the indi-
vidual's freedom to drive his auto providing it does so without denying him the due process
of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Although there have been constitutional
objections to such statutes, they have always been found constitutional. See State v. John-
son, - Iowa -, -- , 135 N.W.2d 518, 525 (1965); Comment, 49 Va. L. Rev. 386, 388-89
(1963).
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show great diversity in dealing with the fundamental problem9 in spite of the
existence of the Uniform Vehicle Code.'0
Chemical testing techniques do not assure conviction, however, even though
their results may clearly indicate that the defendant was intoxicated. There are
three basic types of chemical tests: breath, urine, and blood."' Liquor's intoxi-
cating effect is produced by alcohol present in an individual's brain, and the
degree of the effect is directly proportional to the concentration of alcohol present
there.12 Precise measurement of the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the
brain is not feasible; instead, the amount of alcohol in the brain can only be
estimated by measuring parameters capable of furnishing a more-or-less reliable
indication of that concentration.
Since alcohol is carried to the brain by the blood, it would seem that the most
reliable estimate of the brain alcohol could be made by measuring the alcohol
content of the blood. This is one of the most frequently employed tests13 and
is likely to become even more popular as a result of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Schmerber v. California.4 However, there is reason to believe that
during the first hour after drinking, the concentration of alcohol in the blood
taken from the arm is not necessarily a reliable estimate of the concentration of
alcohol in the brain.' 5
Another parameter often measured is the concentration of alcohol in the lung
air, through the use of a "Breathalyzer" or "Drunkometer."' 6 In this way the
concentration of alcohol in the blood in the lungs is indirectly measured. The
parameter measured here is one step further removed from that which actually
produces intoxication; the test first assumes that the alcoholic concentration of
the breath is a reliable indication of that in the lungs, and then that the con-
centration in the blood in the lungs is a reliable indicator of that in the brain.
Results of such tests can also be unreliable in certain circumstances, particularly
if any alcohol remains in the defendant's mouth,'7 or if the operator fails to
purge the machine of any residual alcohol vapor at the beginning of the test.'8
Finally, the alcoholic concentration in the brain may be estimated by measur-
9 For compilations of the state statutory citations and some of the features of each, see
Comments, 31 Temp. L.Q. 372, 374 n.11 (1958); 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 603, 604 (1964); 18
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370, 377-78 (1961).
10 Uniform Vehicle Code § 6-205 provides for implicit consent to a blood test by those
arrested for drunken driving and for the revocation of the driving licenses of those who
expressly refuse to consent. This code has the support of the National Safety Council, and
was introduced in 24 state legislatures in 1963. Comment, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 603, 605 (1964).
11 See generally Kozelka, supra note 2; Erwin, supra note 5.
12 Harger, supra note 4, at 111-17.
13 See Breithaupt v. Abram, supra note 8, at 436-37 n.3, where it is stated that 23 states
sanction the use of a blood test by statute, while other states have allowed blood tests with
court approval without statutory authority.
14 384 U.S. 757 (1966). This case held that blood test results are admissible at trial even
when the sample was taken without the defendant's approval.
15 Borkenstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 20. This first hour is the stage of "active absorp-
tion." It is estimated that the concentration of alcohol reaches a maximum between one-
half hour and one hour after drinking. Kozelka, supra note 2, at M11-3.
16 Breath tests are used by police in 38 states and 12 foreign countries. Comment, 31 Temp.
L.Q. 372, 373 (1958). But cf. Johnson, "The Breathalyzer and Its Applications-A Critique,"
2 Med. Sci. & Law 23 (1961).
17 Borkenstein & Smith, supra note 5, at 20.
18 Johnson, supra note 16. One case has refused to admit evidence of the results of using
such a device as inherently unreliable without a showing of any specific defect in the ma-
chine. People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949).
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ing that present in the defendant's urine. When this test is used, the results must
be modified by a correction factor before they are even a good indication of
blood alcohol.19
Even if he is forced to concede that the testing equipment used furnishes a
reliable estimate of alcohol in the brain, a defense attorney may still be able,
at trial, to weaken or destroy the effectiveness of the evidence produced by this
equipment. The state must show that the results offered as evidence actually came
from a specimen or test of the defendant, and that the person who conducted
the tests was competent.2 0 Perhaps the most troublesome burden on the state is
that of showing an "uninterrupted chain of identification" from the time a
sample is taken until it is tested.
2 '
A defense attorney may also contend that, despite test results which would
indicate an average man was incapable of operating a motor vehicle, his client,
as an individual, was not intoxicated.2 2 Medical researches have conducted con-
trolled experiments to determine the concentration of alcohol which will produce
a noticeable impairment of a drinker's ability to drive. They have recommended
that three general categories of degree of impairment be established.2 Some
states have followed these recommendations, creating statutory rebuttable pre-
sumptions of sobriety or intoxication depending upon the range in which a
defendant's blood alcohol is found to lie.2 4 These ranges are expressly designed
to meet the objection that one person may have a greater capacity to absorb
alcohol without displaying noticeable effects than another.25
19 Kozelka, supra note 2, at M11-10.
20 DeWitt, "Some Legal Problems in 'Driving Under the Influence' Cases," in Institute on
Scientific and Laboratory Methods of Judicial Proof, p. 111-34 (Univ. of Wisc. 1951).
21 In the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General of one state this stringent requirement
has been the source of the failure in his state to introduce the results of such tests even
though they are admissible. Evans, "Admissibility of Blood Analysis Data on Question
of Intoxication," 14 S.C.L.Q. 395 (1962). In the case of People v. Lesinski, 10 Misc. 2d
254, 171 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1958), a patrolman took a urine sample home
with him when he went off duty at 1:00 am. He placed it on his dresser and went to
sleep. The next day at noon he delivered it to the police chemist. It was held that the
chain of evidence had been broken because of the time lapse while the sample was on the
dresser, and the defendant was acquitted. Id. at 256, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 341. For similar
results in other courts, see Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1947);
Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ky. 1951); Jones v. Forrest City, 388
S.W.2d 386 (Ark. 1965); Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
See also Note, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 895 (1962).
22 See Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wisc. 394, 402, 291 N.W. 384, 387-88 (1940).
23 The American Medical Association's Committee on Street and Highway Accidents and
the National Safety Council's Committee on Tests for Driver Intoxication have approved
these classifications. The first zone has as its limit an alcohol content of 0.05%. This is
equivalent to 2 oz. of 100 proof whiskey or 2 bottles of beer in a person weighing 150
pounds. It was recommended that a blood alcohol in this zone shall be taken to be prima
faie evidence that the driver was "not under the influence" of alcohol. The second zone's
limit is 0.15%. This represents 6 oz. of 100 proof whiskey or 6 bottles of beer in a person
weighing 150 pounds. In this zone, the evidence of blood alcohol should be considered
relevant, but not prima fade evidence that the driver was "under the influence" of alcohol.
The third zone includes blood alcohol above .15%. It was recommended that a blood alcohol
in this zone should be taken as prima facie evidence that the driver was "under the influence"
of alcohol. Harger, supra note 4, at 111-20.
24 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1031.1 (Supp: 1965). The effect of such a statute is that if
a defendant displays a concentration in the first range there is a rebuttable presumption
that he is not intoxicated; if in the second range there is no presumption but the results
of the tests are admissible; if in the third range, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
defendant is intoxicated.
25 Kozelka, supra note 2, at 111-6:
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Frequently, however, no such presumptions are made. Instead the results of
the tests are introduced, and the state must then furnish an expert witness to
testify that a person displaying that concentration of alcohol in his blood would
be intoxicated.
26
Adoption of the presumptions by statute seems to be a rational approach to
the problem. These presumptions are based upon scientifically controlled experi-
ments rather than upon the opinion of only one expert witness. In addition to
saving the expense of an expert witness in each case, 27 this procedure might
reduce the volume of litigation, for there seems to be less motivation for prose-
cuting or defending a case in which the defendant falls clearly within a classifica-
tion for which a presumption has been established.
Sound Motion Pictures as Evidence
Police in several states now take sound motion pictures of a driver who is
brought to the police station under a charge of driving while intoxicated. 28
Originally, the purpose of these movies seems to have been to encourage guilty
pleas by illustrating to the driver and his attorney the driver's appearance and
demeanor when arrested. 29 However, in Lanford v. People,80 they were presented
as evidence at trial.
In Lanford, the defendant was taken to police headquarters after being ar-
rested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The sound movies were taken
there without first obtaining the defendant's consent. His speech, as reproduced
on the movie's sound track, was noticeably slurred. The movies were admitted
over the defendant's objections that the Constitution prohibited the introduction
of such evidence,31 and he was convicted.
It is possible, formalistically, to separate a sound motion picture into its
visual and auditory component parts. Courts reason that if each of the compon-
ents is found acceptable as evidence, the whole must also be admissible. With
the visual component, another division is made. The continual visual image is
divided into a series of still ones, the reasoning being that a motion picture
is analogous to a series of still photos taken at close time intervals. 32 Thus, the
It is a matter of common knowledge that the person accustomed to the use of alcohol
can drink more and show fewer symptoms of toxicity than a person not so accus-
tomed . . . .The habituated individual acquires an increased ability to compensate
psychically and functionally for the effects of the intoxicant.
The absorption rate of alcohol into the bloodstream depends upon whether it is taken
"straight" or with food, the rate being slower with food. Id. at II-3. Regardless, in all
cases, intoxication is reached when the alcohol content of the brain reaches 0.25%. Id.
at 111-7.
26 See, e.g., Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 22.
27 Harger, supra note 4, at I1-24.
28 Erwin, supra note 5, at 89.
29 Id. The author quotes a California district attorney:
"We found that, by taking motion pictures, we could readily get pleas of guilty
from a lot of young men who were not used to drinking. The motion pictures amply
demonstrated the intoxication of the drivers, and upon being shown the motion
pictures, or after having their attorneys look at the motion pictures, it was easy to
get them to plead guilty."
30 - Colo. -, 409 P.2d 829 (1966), 41 Notre Dame Law. 1009 (1966). See also,
Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
31 The defendant contended that his constitutional right against self-incrimination had
been violated. For a discussion of this issue, see text accompanyng notes 48-96 infra.
32 Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125, 127-28 (1930); Houts, Photographic
Misrepresentation §§ 20.01-20.02, at 20-1 (1964); Note, 22 Ga. B.J. 92, 94 (1959).
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rules relating to the admission of motion pictures are basically the same as
those pertaining to still photos.3 3 A proper foundation must be laid by estab-
lishing identification and accuracy 4 Since motion pictures, unlike still photos,
are able to illustrate speed,35 it must also be established that the movies ac-
curately represent this quality 38
The sound track of a motion picture should be treated as analogous to the
reproduction of sound by other recording devices. An independent foundation
relating to the sound reproduction qualities of the equipment would seem
necessary.3'
Like a photograph or a sound recording, a sound motion picture may only be
used in conjunction with a witness's testimony,3 8 and it is because of this that
the "component" approach may be unrealistic. Since a movie is only a witness's
"pictured expression of the data observed by him and therein communicated to
the tribunal more accurately than by words,"39 it is necessary only for him to
state that the movie accurately represents the impressions he received in witnes-
sing the event in question.40 Yet a jury may give more weight to the evidence
presented by mechanical reproduction devices, and especially movies, than it
would to ordinary verbal testimony.41 The procedure of setting up the projection
equipment and darkening the courtroom4 2 draws more attention to the film than
would be accorded normal testimony or the introduction of either still photos
or sound recordings. To this extent the whole is greater than the sum of its parts
and may overshadow equally strong testimony offered by the defense in rebuttal.
This effect may have been recognized by appellate courts, although no motion
picture has ever been rejected simply because it was one.43 Broader discretion
33 Houts, supra note 32.
34 Id. § 25.01, at 25-1-25-2; see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 792 (3d ed. 1940). For a
detailed discussion of the foundation problem, see Paradis, "The Celluloid Witness," 37
U. Colo. L. Rev. 235 (1965).
35 Houts, supra note 32, § 20.03, at 20-3. The author states that the apparent speed
of moving subjects toward and away from the camera can be doubled or halved depending
entirely upon the lens which is used in the camera. See id. at 20-4-20-11 for illustrations
of this distortion. In personal-injury litigation, in which motion pictures are most often
used, the quantum of speed may not be essential. Paradis, supra note 34, at 243-45. But
distortion in the speed of movement of one allegedly intoxicated could obviously be
prejudicial to him.
36 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marks, 230 Ala. 417, 420, 161 So. 543, 545 (1935), criti-
cized in Paradis, supra note 34, at 243. See Houts, supra note 32, § 20.03, at 20-12; Scott,
Photographic Evidence § 624, at 510 (1942).
37 Before dictaphone evidence could be introduced in Steve M. Solomon, Jr., Inc. v.
Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 88 S.E.2d 167 (1955), the court demanded this foundation:
(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device was capable of taking
testimony. (2) It must be shown that the operator of the device was competent to
operate the device. (3) The authenticity and correctness of the recording must be estab-
lished. (4) It must be shown that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made.
(5) The manner of the preservation of the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must be
identified.
Id. at 211-12, 88 S.E.2d at 171. See also Roper, "Sound Recording Devices Used as Evidence,"
9 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 523, 526 (1960) ; Note, 18 Okla. L. Rev. 87, 88 (1965).
as State v. Palmer, 227 La. 691, 716, 80 So. 2d 374, 383 (1955); Houts, supra note 32,
§ 30.02, at 30-7; 3 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 792, at 178; Note, 22 Ga. B.J. 92, 94 (1958).
39 3 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 792, at 178.
40 McCormick, Evidence § 181, at 387 (1954); 3 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 792, at 185;
Paradis, supra note 34, at 238.
41 See 3 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 798(a), at 203.
42 McCormick, supra note 40, at 389.
43 Paradis, supra note 34, at 235.
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may be allowed the trial court when ruling upon the admissibility of motion
pictures rather than upon other evidence. 44
Although mechanical reproduction devices have been praised for their ability
to present clearly the testimony of a witness,4 5 at least one court was worried by
the impact such "clarity" may have had on the jury.46 Using the trial judge's
discretion may be the only practical way in which this impact can be controlled
in each trial as it unfolds. He is clearly in the best position to evaluate it.
Even if a movie such as the one in Lanford is admitted, all of the physical
aberrations which an allegedly intoxicated defendant may exhibit can well be
due to some cause other than intoxication.47 A moving picture should not be
admitted if its use is so dramatic that it effectively deprives the defendant of any
ability to rebut.
Constitutional Issues
Self-Incrimination. In Lanford v. People,48 defendant was removed to police
headquarters where sound motion pictures were taken of him without his con-
sent.49 The results, introduced as evidence at his trial over his objections, showed
him refusing, in a slurred voice,50 to undergo sobriety tests51 which the police
suggested. Defendant was convicted. On appeal, he contended that the "in-
troduction of the motion picture violated [his] ... constitutional right against
self-incrimination because it showed him refusing to submit to sobriety tests."
52
The Supreme Court of Colorado held the motion picture admissible for the
44 McCormick, supra note 40, at 389. See also State v. Zobel, - Iowa -, -, 134
N.W.2d 101, 111 (1965); Scott, supra note 36, § 625, at 512-13; Note, 22 Ga. B.J. 92,
94 (1960); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 1315, 1317 (1933). This may be a very broad discretion. Of
about 120 appellate decisions found by one author dealing with motion pictures, "fewer
than half a dozen reverse the trial judge for an abuse of discretion." Paradis, supra note 34,
at 245.
45 Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 103, 225 S.W.2d 417, 418 (1949); Cady v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 23 Wash. 2d 851, 863, 162 P.2d 813, 818 (1945); Roper,
supra note 37, at 525.
46 This court stated:
Such photographs would be likely to impress a jury to such an extent as virtually to
preclude the possibility of an acquittal, however otherwise reasonably justified, because
the vividness of their appeal to the eye might well give them greater significance than
that to which their evidential value really entitled them.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 145-46, 81 A.2d 569, 572 (1951). There was also
an element of coercion of the defendant in this case, and it may have been decided upon
this narrow ground. However, courts have allowed as evidence motion pictures showing
a defendant signing his confession. People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930).
47 See note 5 supra.
48 - Colo. - , 409 P.2d 829 (1966).
49 The opinion in Lanford states: "There is evidence in the record that the defendant
was not cooperative when the film was being taken and refused to take designated co-
ordination tests." Lanford v. State, - Colo. - , - , 409 P.2d 829, 830 (1966). Whether
defendant actually refused to be the subject of the film, or whether he merely did not
consent, is not clear. This distinction may now be constitutionally unimportant. See
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441 (1957) (Warren, C. J., dissenting), quoted with
approval in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 n.4 (1966).
50 Apparently the most damaging evidence presented in the film was the quality of the
defendant's speech in responding to police requests. Lanford v. People, supra note 49, at -,
409 P.2d at 830.
51 The tests which defendant refused to take were "coordination" tests, and evidently




limited purpose of depicting defendant's physical characteristics at the time of
his arrest.5 3
In effect the defendant incorporated two constitutional objections into his
single assignment of error. The first, discussed here, relates to the fact that his
own words and image, recreated by a motion picture, were used as damaging
evidence against him, resulting in a violation of his "constitutional"5" right
against self-incrimination. 55
The scope of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, until recently,
depended upon whether he was being prosecuted under state or federal law.
Until 1964 protection against self-incrimination in state prosecutions was
determined solely under that state's constitution.56 Twining v. New Jersey57
limited use of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution to federal
prosecutions. 58 But in Malloy v. Hogan59 the Supreme Court abruptly 0 "suc-
ceeded" 61 Twining, deciding that in state prosecutions a defendant is guaranteed,
through the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination.
62
Despite the fact that they evolved separately under differing state constitutions
and under the United States Constitution, decisions in the area of Lanford's first
constitutional objection were remarkably uniform. There seemed little doubt,
until Schmerber v. California,63 that the privilege against self-incrimination
would not bar the use of movies showing a defendant's behavior at the time of
his arrest.
"Testimonial Compulsion" or "Body Evidence"? In the early case of Holt
6 Id. at - , 409 P.2d at 832.
54 At no point in its opinion does the Colorado court indicate whether the "constitutional"
questions were resolved under the Colorado or United States Constitution, or both.
5 The second objection was that the film showed him objecting to performing certain
sobriety tests. See text accompanying notes 89-96 infra.
56 Every state but Iowa and New Jersey has a constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. In Iowa the privilege has been read into the state's due process clause, and
in New Jersey it has been adopted by statute. Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 427 (1964). The
language of the federal fifth amendment appears verbatim in 16 state constitutions (including
California, Michigan, New York, and Ohio); it appears virtually verbatim in 14 others;
there is "different language coming to the same thing" in 11 other state constitutions.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2552, at 319 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761-62 n.6 (1966), where the Court refused to distinguish between "many
state constitutions, including those of most of the original Colonies" which "phrase the
privilege in terms of compelling a person to give 'evidence' against himself," and the fifth
amendment's use of the word "witness."
57 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
58 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908). See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 434 (1957) ; Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 222, 27 So. 2d 186, 191 (1946).
59 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
60 The court had affirmed Twining as recently as 1961. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117,
128 (1961).
61 Schmerber v. California, supra note 56, at 760-61:
But [Twining] . . . holding that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do
not embrace this Fifth Amendment privilege, has been succeeded by Malloy v.
Hogan . . . . We there held that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment secures against
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal
infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence."
62 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). See State v. Johnson, - Iowa, -, -, 135
N.W.2d 518, 521 (1965). On incorporation generally, see Cushman, "Incorporation: Due
Process and the Bill of Rights," 51 Cornell L.Q. 467 (1966).
63 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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v. United States,6 4 defendant claimed his federal constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination had been violated when he was forced to try on a blouse in
front of the jury. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, said:
Another objection is based upon an extravagent extension of the Fifth
Amendment .... But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.65
The Court thus distinguished "testimonial compulsion" from "body evidence,"
holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to the former.66
Although "not models of clarity and precision," 67 the phrases furnished prece-
dent for numerous subsequent cases. In both state68 and federal prosecutions,
"body evidence" has been held to include psychiatric examinations,69 samples of
handwriting, 70 voice recordings,7 1 chemical tests of body specimens,72 finger-
prints, 73 and other samples of a defendant's body.
74
The Distinction Under Schmerber. Sckmerber dealt with the admissibility of
blood test results where the sample had been removed from the defendant's body
against his wishes. The majority75 did not doubt that "in requiring petitioner to
submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the State compelled
64 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
65 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).
66 The majority of writers seem to have accepted this holding as historically correct,
although the "history" and development of the protections now incorporated in the
fifth amendment seem to depend, to some extent, upon the proposition the particular
writer espouses. Compare, Fink, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-A Critical
Reappraisal," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 722, 723 (1962); 8 Wigmore, supra note 56, § 2263, at
378. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
458-59 (1966), traces the protection from "ancient times" through the trial of John Lilburn
and into our Bill of Rights. Comment, 31 Temp. L.Q. 372, 383 (1958), criticizes Wigmore
for failing to trace the privilege to its origins in Jewish law.
67 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.,
Douglas, J., concurring).
68 See Comment, 31 Temp. L.Q. 372, 386-87 n.72 (1958), for a tabulation of state cases.
But cf. Spencer v. State, 404 P.2d 46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Smith v. State, 247 Ala.
354, 358, 24 So. 2d 546, 549 (1946).
69 Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408, 415 (8th Cir. 1965); Hunt v. State, 248
Ala. 217, 224, 27 So. 2d 186, 193 (1946); Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 306, 35
A.2d 307, 311 (1944). But cf. State v. Olson, - Minn. -, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966).
70 Bryant v. United States, 244 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1957).
71 Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838
(1951); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
72 People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 257, 260 P.2d 8, 11 (1953); Block v. People, 125
Colo. 36, 42-44, 240 P.2d 512, 516 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); State v.
Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 591, 83 A.2d 441, 446 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952);
State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 797, 117 SXE.2d 749, 751 (1961) ; State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App.
192, 196, 20 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1938).
73 State v. Swallow, 100 Misc. 447, 455, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915, 919 (Ct. Gen. Sessions
of Peace, N.Y. County 1917); Commonwealth v. Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 583, 73 A.2d
688, 691 (1950).
74 People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 73, 292 P.2d 513, 515 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 307 (1944). See 8 Wigmore, supra note 56, § 2265, at 387 for
an extensive tabulation of situations in which the "body evidence" rule has been followed.
75 The "opinion of the court" represents that of Justice Brennan, who was its author,
and Justices Clark and White. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred, but "would go
no further" than holding that taking of the blood tests "involved no testimonial com-
pulsion." Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black and Douglas, and Justice Fortas dissented
in three separate opinions.
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him to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to pros-
ecute him for a criminal offense," 76 but phrased the crucial constitutional ques-
tion as whether this resulted in petitioner's being "compelled 'to be a witness
against himself.' " They ruled that the "scope of the privilege" does not co-
incide "with the complex of values it helps to protect,"7 8 but rather, reaches only
defendant's right " 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his will.' "79 Thus, the protections of the privilege include an "ac-
cused's communications, whatever form they might take," but not "'real or
physical evidence.' ',80 Thus they recognized Holmes' dichotomy, but they were
careful to add that "we are not to be understood to agree with past applications
in all instances." 8'1 The Court carefully pointed out that lie detector tests are ac-
tually directed at obtaining "testimonial" evidence, even though no vocal com-
munications8 2 are involved.
83
What then of a defendant's voice and likeness depicted, as in Lanford, in
motion pictures? His voice-his verbal utterances-are clearly being used as
evidence against him. However, it is not the words he utters which are incrim-
inating, and they alone are the product of his free will. Instead, it is only the
manner in which the product of his thought is formed, albeit imperfectly, which
is responsible for his incrimination. These verbal traces, in spite of being the
form in which his free will is often expressed, themselves represent no inter-
change. Instead they are "real or physical evidence" with which "the scope
of the privilege" does not "coincide."
Admissibility of Refusal To Submit to Sobriety Test. The defendant in Lan-
ford complained that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated by
the admission at his trial of portions of the film in which he was heard refusing
to submit to sobriety tests.84 The Colorado court ruled that upon request he
would have been entitled to have the judge caution the jury that the film was
offered only to illustrate the defendant's general demeanor;8 5 apparently they
were not to consider his refusal to submit to the tests as evidence of guilt.
Schmerber v. California6 has resolved the states' split on the question of
whether a blood test may constitutionally be taken against a suspect's wishes 7
76 Schmerber v. California, 384- U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
77 Ibid.
78 Id. at 762.
79 Id. at 763, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Justices Black and
Douglas could "find nothing whatever in the majority opinion in that case which either
directly or indirectly supports the holding in this case." Schmerber v. California, supra
note 76, at 777 (dissenting opinion).
80 Schmerber v. California, supra note 76 at 763-64.
81 Id. at 764.
82 Wigmore was convinced that historically the privilege was "limited to testimonial
disclosures. It was directed at the employment of legal process to extract from the person's
own lips an admission of guilt, which would then take the place of other evidence."
8 Wigmore, supra note 56, § 2263, at 378. The "majority" in Schmerber, after quoting the
passage above, was careful to add that it was not adopting the Wigmore formulation.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 n.7 (1966). The dissenting opinion of justice
Black with Justice Douglas concurring also rejects the notion that the privilege is limited
solely to vocal utterances. Id. at 774-75 (dissenting opinion).
83 Schmerber v. California, supra note 82, at 764.
84 Lanford v. State, - Colo. -, - 409 P.2d 829, 830 (1966).
85 Id. at - , 409 P.2d at 832.
86 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
87 May be taken without consent: Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 42-44, 240 P.2d 512,
516 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); State v. Johnson, - Iowa - -,
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and has established that sobriety tests, as long as an unspecified quantum and
type of force is not exceeded,88 may be performed upon an unwilling subject.
That case may also have decided whether or not a refusal by the suspect to un-
dergo a requested sobriety test may be offered as evidence at trial.
At first blush, it would seem to be valid to argue that if there is no constitu-
tional right, under ordinary circumstances, to refuse a proposed sobriety test,8 9
there should be no constitutional right to have evidence of a refusal excluded at
trial. The decisions in Griffin v. California0 and Miranda v. Arizona9' seem to
make this argument more compelling. In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that if
a defendant refuses on the basis of the fifth amendment to testify during his trial,
the prosecutor may not argue that such a refusal is indicative of the defendant's
guilt.92 In Miranda, the Court found that if a defendant exercises his fifth amend-
ment privilege to decline to answer questions while "under police custodial inter-
rogation," the prosecutor may not introduce evidence to that effect at trial.9 3
However, the Court in Schmerber indicated, by dictum,94 that it will not
135 N.W.2d 518, 524 (1965) (dictum); State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 797, 117 SY.2d
749, 751 (1961) (dictum). May not be taken: Booker v. City of Cincinnati, 22 Ohio L. Abs.
286, 288 (C.P. 1936). Some states had avoided the issue by giving a suspect, by statute,
the right to refuse to undergo a test, but providing for automatic suspension of his driving
"privileges" if he exercised that right. See, e.g., N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(1); Va.
Code Ann. § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1966). For complete list of state statutes in this area, see
Comment, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370, 377-78 (1961).
88 This requirement follows under the due process clause and the fourth amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures. There must, of course, be some com-
pulsion against a suspect to incriminate himself before the fifth amendment protections
are available. But when it is the quantum or type of force which is attacked, the four-
teenth and fourth (which has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth)
amendments are the traditional approaches. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
where pumping a suspect's stomach without his consent to obtain evidence involved police
methods so brutal as to violate defendant's right to due process of law. There the Court
said:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too ener-
getically. This is conduct that shocks the consclence. Illegally breaking into the privacy
of petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
Id. at 172.
On the other hand, in, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the Court decided that
removal of a blood sample from an unconscious suspect by a qualified doctor in a hospital
did not involve such brutality.
It was against this background that Schmerber was decided, and over conflicting
precedents that the split in the Court developed.
No force or invasion of a suspect's body is ordinarily present when movies are taken.
On the other hand, if a suspect is forcibly removed to the scene of his alleged crime, and
is there forced to re-enact the crime, compulsion like that in Rochin may be involved, and
the evidence excluded. See Bates v. State, 40 Ala. App. 549, 117 So. 2d 258 (1959); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A.2d 569 (1951).
89 The majority indicated that there may be circumstances when a suspect's request
to be excused from chemical testing must be obeyed by police. Evidentially, if for reasons
of "fear, concern for health, or religious scrupple," a suspect prefers not to have a blood
test taken, he may request that a breath test (see text accompanying notes 16-19 supra)
may be taken instead. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
90 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
91 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
92 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
93 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-91 (1966).
94 The petitioner in Schmerber had also refused a request that he undergo a breath
19671 NOTES
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
accept the converse of these theorems-that if there is no constitutional right
to refuse, there is no constitutional right to have the evidence of that refusal
excluded. 95 The Court reasoned that even if the evidence produced by a certain
test is "physical or real," evidence of a defendant's refusal to take that test may
be "testimonial" and therefore protected by the fifth amendment. Logically,
this argument seems to be without fault. But it is likely to place policemen in
yet another difficult situation. They may compel a suspect to submit to a sobriety
test, but if he refuses and is somehow able to prevent the testing, the police
may not be able to tell the jury of that fact. Thus, the police are encouraged to
use some degree of force upon the defendant, the very antithesis of the Miranda
decision.96
In Lanford the sounds which the jury heard were acceptable, so long as they
were taken only as sounds. But when they rise to the stature of words, as when
defendant refused to submit to a sobriety test, they become inadmissible. The
trial judge's ruling that the jury may hear the sound portion of film, if ac-
companied by an instruction to hear only the way in which the words were
spoken, and not what they said, appears logically infallible, even in the light of
the most recent Supreme Court decisions. But it is unlikely that such an in-
struction could really be effective; the judge's comment may only further im-
press a jury with the defendant's refusal to submit to the tests. This is another
unfortunate result of a logically sound decision.
CONCLUSION
Police and prosecutors in another attempt to secure more convictions in
drunken driving cases have begun to take sound motion pictures of drivers
brought to the police station. The arresting officer's testimony of a suspect's
behavior may be rebutted, and scientific testing of a suspect's urine, blood, or
breath, even when obtainable and admissible as evidence, is not infallible. These
difficulties may be partially circumvented by offering a movie as evidence. By
analogizing sound movies to still photographs and sound recordings, rules
relating to their admissibility have been established. However, such an approach
seemingly ignores the inordinately great impression a sound movie may make in
relation to other testimony.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has decided that sound motion pictures of
one allegedly under the influence of alcohol taken at a police station without his
consent are admissible when he is later brought to trial. If the sound reveals
him refusing to submit to a sobriety test the film may still be admitted, but only
to reveal his general demeanor.
Introduction of a movie of a defendant probably does not violate his federal
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, now made applicable to the
states, merely because his likeness is reproduced or his voice heard. Schmerber v.
California has reaffirmed, although in a limited sense, the distinction between
test, and evidence of that refusal was allowed at trial. However, he did not object at
trial to the introduction of the evidence, and therefore had no standing to argue the
question before the Supreme Court. Schmerber v. California, supra note 89, 769 n.9.
95 Ibid. It should be noted that saying "there is a constitutional right to refuse" is
merely a shorthand method of expressing the fact that there is a constitutional right
to have the evidence excluded at trial following a timely refusal.
96 See iranda v. Arizona, supra note 93, at 445-58,
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